center of gravity has decisively shifted south and westward. San Fran cisco, earlier an immigrant town, remains a magnet for the foreign born, its pull intensified by the region's vastly greater population. But the capital of today's immigrant America is unquestionably Los Ange les, that ill-defined blob sprawling over five southern California coun ties. And at the other end of the country, Miami, though a much smaller metropolis than the rest, holds the nation's densest concentra tion of immigrants; it was the very first to receive the new immigrant tide and is still an entry point of extraordinary magnitude.
I
The newcomers' tendency to gravitate toward this particular cluster lof places affects immigration's impact; it also influences the prospects : for immigrant America. The urban centers at the heart of immigrant America have very limited attraction for the native-born, which is why much of the United States has been slow to be touched by the reemer gence of mass immigration, the expanded foreign-born population notwithstanding. By the same token, the impact of immigration is magnified in those few places on which the newcomers converge precisely why established residents of regions such as Miami, Los An geles, or even New York have been so prone to immigration anxiety. There may well be an irrational side to these allergic responses to im migration, but one should not underestimate the rapidity of the ethnic shifts engendered by immigration and the unsettling effects of these changes. Moreover, one can find plenty of good reasons to think that immigration's effects may not be completely benign. After all, these very largest places earlier welcomed other migrants, most notably African Americans and Puerto Ricans, who started out at the bottom and then lingered there, as did a disheartening number of the migrants' offspring. The advent of a large group of newcomers may spell bad news for those urban residents still at the margins, struggling to move ahead at a time when the changing shape of urban economies puts all less-skilled workers at risk.
Life in the big city scares off the native-born, who, voting with their feet, have been departing the immigrant metropolis for other places, where, as it happens, the foreign-born are not so frequently found.! But the metropolis offers something essential to the foreign-born: their friends, kin, and compatriots, whose presence provides most, if not all, of the resources needed to get started. Immigration is a network-driven phenomenon, with newcomers naturally attracted to the places where they have contacts and the buildup of contacts facilitating later moves to the key immigrant centers. The importance of networks explains why immigration is so geographically channelized: the decisions of prior migrants exercise a long-term effect on the options available to those who follow them. 2 But if immigrants find virtues in congregating together, it is not quite so clear that they have selected the best places. Much of urban America has gone through the wringer over the past half century. Many cities. have actually lost population, and manufacturing, long the key to the urban economic base, has been severely hemorrhaging jobs. Still, immi grants have generally stayed away from the least robust urban centers. Los Angeles, Miami, and San Francisco have all been gaining jobs and people during recent decades, despite their ups and downs, most no tably the deep slump into which Los Angeles fell during the first half of 19905. As for New York and Chicago, although their periods of greatest dynamism belong to history, the economies of these number one and number three urban centers have shown remarkable buoyancy throughout the past several decades.
Each of the top immigrant destinations represents a going enter prise-and how could it be otherwise, since immigrants always move in search of jobs. The potential problem with the continuing attraction of urban centers for the foreign-born lies in the job structure. The econ omy of today's immigrant metropolis has been completely overhauled . Large urban economies still contain plenty of jobs for people who ar rive with few skills and must start at the very bottom. But, relatively speaking, there are far fewer such positions than in the past and the number is continually dwindling. While the same generalization holds for the U.S, economy in general, it applies with particular force to these capitals of immigrant America, whose persistent role in the economic landscape rests on a particularly deep transformation in the ways of making a living. The leading immigrant destinations have shifted heav ily to jobs requiring higher skills and education. Although this change does not stop newcomers from finding an entry berth, it may well make it harder for them-or their children-to hew to the path of upward progress followed by earlier immigrants and their descendants. And im migrant concentration is unlikely to make matters any easier, with job and wage competition among immigrants an inevitable side effect of the newcomers' tendency to cluster.
Of course, of these processes are likely to work themselves out in distinctive ways: the leading immigrant destinations are far from uniform in structure or history; more important, they have come to harbor immi grant populations of very different types. The axes of variation are multi pIe, involving national-origin composition, the degree of ethnic hetero geneity, and skill makeup, to name just the most important. And it is not simply a matter of East versus West Coast, or older metropolis versus new. Each immigrant destination is in important ways distinct from any other, reflecting both the ways in which geographic and historical partic ularities shape immigrant flows and the impact of the region's place in the urban hierarchy on the options available to arrivals from abroad.
Thus, this book is an attempt to reckon with the new immigrant America in those places where its presence is most pronounced: the urban regions of Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, Miami, and Chicago, listed in order of the size of their respective immigrant popu lations. Though the book touches on aspects related to the impact of immigrants on these regions, its main concern is the issue at the heart of the contemporary immigration debate: can today's newcomers make it?
Many researchers have already weighed in on that question, but no one has yet taken full account of immigration's fundamentally urban aspect. That so many new arrivals come with relatively low skills is a central aspect of today's reality, but other considerations are also key. Of equal importance, immigrants flock to those places where the low skilled worker-regardless of ethnic background-is in particular trouble. It is for that reason that immigration's urban convergence calls out for special attention.
This book builds on the research of the many scholars who have con cerned themselves with the urban dimensions of immigration. Even so, gaping holes in our knowledge base reflect the striking degree to which scholarly attention has been skewed toward some urban regions and away from others. Consider, for example, the contrast between New York and Chicago. The Chicago School of Sociology emerged in the 19205 as an attempt, in part, IO understand the ways in which the im migration of the t\yentieth cemury worked itself out in its urban context. Though the in:elIectual influence of the Chicago School per sists, research on the ne\\" irLmigrant Chicago is virtually nonexistent. By contrast, New York, home ,0 many "New York schools," but none of sociology, has proved fertile ground for immigration researchers, whose thread of important, publications spans from the early 1970S to today. Until recently, Los _-\ngeles received relatively little seri ous scholarly attention, perhaps few researchers had met the prerequisite for serious study or ;:he overcoming their prejudices against LA's particular form of urbanism and urban living. But re searchers appear to have moved be\~ond their bias; the past few years have seen an outpouring of books and other publications on Los Ange les, many of them zeroing in on immigration and the region's ethnic transformation. Immigration scholars have also been hard at work studying Miami, a city that shares many traits beyond its sun belt loca tion with Los Angeles. Immigration studies in Miami, however, have tended to give short shrift to the demographic side, and the great major-, ity of work focuses on dominant group, the Cubans. By contrast, San Francisco, a region with almost as many immigrants as Miami, though of entirely different origins, has been almost completely-and unaccountably-neglected, an occasional monograph excepted.
This book therefore seeks to consolidate our understanding of these leading immigration centers, adding to the established scholarship where it exists and extending the information for those more neglected immigrant urban regions. But we are also attempting something differ ent: to go beyond the single case study to compare the immigrant expe rience across this tier of leading immigrant destinations. While we cer tainly expect to find some similarities, the unique characteristics of each of the places and the differences in their respective immigrant flows highlight the ways in which the urban context matters.
Like many other studies of immigration, this book relies on the de cennial cens~ses of population-long the workhorses of immigration research. For all their utility, however, the censuses suffer from one cru cial flaw: they rapidly become dated. The 1990 census painted a por trait of America as it looked in the spring of that year, a picture of di minishing utility in early twenty-first century. At a time when the relevant results from the 2000 census are not yet available, however, we do possess an alternative instrument for apprehending immigration's contemporaty reality: the Current Population Survey (CPS), the Census Bureau's monthly vehicle for tracking population during inter census years. In years past, the Census Bureau periodically added a question about place of birth and parents' place of birth, but these items appeared only every few years. Starting in 1994, however, the bu reau made questions about place of birth and parents' place of birth a permanent feature of each month's survey, enabling us to capture the changing reality of immigration through the late 1990S.
Although the CPS universe is smaller than that of the census, one can combine surveys from subsequent years to build up a sample of very respectable size-indeed, one sufficiently large to study particular places, such as our five urban regions, or subgroups, such as immigrants and their descendants. This book makes particular use of a combined Note: Totals fail to sum to 100 due to rounding sample concatenating observations from the I994 through I998 Cur rent Population Surveys.' Admittedly, ,'ie pay a price for our effort to bring the story up to date. Although the total co:-::.bined is quite (N = 4I2,pO), sample sizes as \\~e moye to units of smaller geographic scale and, within them, break dO'wn population by ethnicity or nativity. Consequently, we have on the larger urban region rather than the key city that lies at its center or even the somewhat larger metropolitan area attached to the urban core. Thus when we write of New York, Chicago, or any other of the urban places to which we we mean the urban region, or "consolidated metropolitan statis tical area," to use the official Census Bureau designation, and not the city. (See table I .I for weighted frequencies for the total population and for persons ages 25 to 64 years old in Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, Chicago, Miami, and all other areas combined, cross tabu lated by nativity.)
Although the regional focus necessarily eclipses the differences be tween urban and suburban areas that have so long lain at the heart of much urban analysis, it is in many respects a more useful unit than any of the smaller alternatives. The distinction between urban and subur ban lacks meaningful reality in newer urban regions such as Los Ange les, Miami, and most of San Francisco, with the exception of the rather small cities of San Francisco, Berkeley, and Oakland. From the beginning, the sun belt cities had little urban concentration and rates of density far lower than those in the East; their sprawl made for a multi nucleated metropolis, where any given center possessed limited eco nomic function. Moreover, the self-proclaimed cities of the sun belt are best thought of as cities in only a nominal sense. While the City of Los Angeles contains the most extraordinary combination of urban and suburban within a single municipal jurisdiction, much of the urban core, as defined in terms of urban functions, lies entirely outside the boundaries of the city of Los Angeles. Chicago and New York, of course, remain much more in the nineteenth-century mold, their down towns ever dense and still packed with employment within a range of higher-order economic functions. Nonetheless, growth is increasingly on the periphery; these areas have absorbed many of the central city functions and, as in the sun belt, spread out over a wide space. In other words, the city, such as it is, has been steadily embedded within a re gional economy, in which the broad suburban expanse is increasingly urbanized and finds itself attracting a population of ever greater diver sity-of which the immigrants are one important component.
Urban Fates and Immigrant Destinies
This book looks at the nexus bet\veen urban fates and immigrant des tinies. Each chapter responds to the question posed earlier-Can today's newcomers make it?-tackling the issue from different perspectives. Drawing on data from the five gateway regions, the chapters provide fruitful regional, interethnic, and native-born comparisons, focusing on wage treads, rates of employment and adequate employment, displace ment, ethnic niches, poverty, and the new second-generatioa immigrants. Although the raw material is quantitative, all of the authors have sought to make the discussion accessible even to readers \'lith little or no back ground in statistics. Throughout the book, our emphasis is on graphic dis play of quantitative findings, which makes the numbers easier to appre hend. Many of the chapters use more complex statistical procedures, but the details are always relegated to the footnotes, and we have tried to pre sent results in ways that lend themselves to intuitive interpretation. The re mainder of this chapter, however, places our work in its appropriate intel lectual context, outlining the key debates that we have sought to address.
Immigration and the Urban Condition
"The problem of the 20th century," announced W. E. B. DuBois almost 100 years ago, "is the problem of the color line."4 At the time, the acu ity of the insight may not have been crystal clear, and few were then ready to pay much attention to the arguments of a DuBois. At the turn of the twentieth century, the United States was in the throes of a mass migration, the arrival of so many apparently swarthy migrants from southern and eastern Europe the main source of ethnic disturbance for American elites of the day. In relatively short order, the foreign-born became the unwanted, as restrictionist legislation passed first in I92I, and then modified in I924, fundamentally closed the gates. \Vithout re plenishments from abroad, the teeming immigrant masses American ized; although still viewed with derision until well past midcentury, the degree of hostility and apprehension lessened. s
The fading of immigration from Europe more or less coincided with the advent of the Great Migration; as African Americans headed for northern cities in search of opportunity, they provided a convenient tar get on whom Euro-Americans, new and old, could project their anxi eties and fears, a process that also allowed the racially dubious new immigrants to eventually become "·white."6 For African Americans, however, the urban promise soon clrned to disillusion. Like their im migrant predecessors, L-\frican ~-\mericans initially found a place at the very bottom of urban social sTrucmres, but the task of moving up from and consolidating those i!1itial proved deeply problematic. Accounting for this in experience became one of the cen tral social science preoccupaTions of the past several decades, and re searchers put forth various explanations. The most deeply influential view, enunciated with greateST by the Kerner Commission more than three decades ago and reiterated and strengthened by a number of commentators, most notably the Harvard sociologist William Julius Wilson, emphasized the role of 8 From this perspective, African
Americans had the great misfortune of entering the large urban areas just when their economies began to shift in ways that decreased oppor tunities for the less skilled. The basic bottom-level, entry positions began to disappear. Opportunities somewhat farther up in job hier archy became increasingly hard to obtain. White workers, after all, were never all that willing to help African Americans get good-paying factory jobs, and as the most desirable blue-collar jobs became less available, resistance to integration stiffened. Geographic shifts in pro duction and residence made matters still worse: jobs went to the sub urbs, but the force of residential segregation made it hard for black workers to follow; over time, even the suburban factory base eroded, as jobs leaked out to low-cost areas, first in the United States and then abroad. In some urban centers-Buffalo, Detroit, St. Louis, and Youngstown, to name just a few-deindustrialization delivered a knockout punch. Elsewhere, most notably in the very largest urban ag glomerations with which this book is concerned, a different type of urban economy, organized around the processing and transmission of information, emerged. But this new economy did little for less-skilled African American workers, who once may have managed to hold a job in the factory sector but lacked the proficiencies required by employers in the service sector. Those too young to have known the blue-collar \ city in its heyday grew up with other problems. In the well-known views of William Julius Wilson, the unhappy coincidence of events the disappearance of the factory sector, the out-migration of the black middle class, and the resulting social isolation of the poor-gave rise to an "urban underclass." Lacking the regulative structure of work, as well as the institutions, informal connections, and role models provided by the more complete ghetto community of old, African American ghetto dwellers altered behavioral patterns and attitudes, responding to the around them in self~defeating and self-reproducing ways.9 Just as Wilson's argument gained unprecedented influence, urban America to change in ways that are seemingly incomprehensible in light of the just told: immigrants began flocking to urban regions that purportedly had no place for anyone but the highly skilled. To be . sure, many of the were among the highly educated profession als beckoned to city by the new, information-based urban economy. Indeed, from a historical standpoint, socioeconomic diversity provides contemporary immigration with its most distinctive featu;-e: yesterday, the newcomers almost started out at the very bottom; today, many begin at the middle of job ladder, if not on the upper rungs.
Still, the urban immigrant destinations with which this book is con cerned have been receiving immigrants who bear a distinct resemblance to the arrivals of yore-at least in the sense of lacking the baseline skills of the native-born population, a gap particularly glaring when the com Iparison focuses on the dominant group, native-born whites. As we will ~ note, not every region attracts less-skilled immigrants to the same de ; gree, and there is a good deal of divergence on this axis from place to place. But from the standpoint of the received academic wisdom about urban America, there is something deeply peculiar in the experience of all the key immigrant regions: not only has the foreign-born population burgeoned, these new, less-skilled urban residents are finding a place in the job structure and often working at surprisingly high rates.
If the received diagnosis of the sources of urban distress is correct, then the immigrant pattern represents a significant anomaly. Curi ously, immigration experts have not registered much surprise. On the contrary: successful immigrant entry into the economy bears out a crucial tenet of the migration theories elaborated over the past two decades. Whereas we used to think about migrants as "the uprooted," to quote Oscar Handlin's famous immigration history of almost five decades ago, we now describe them as "the transplanted," to cite a slightly less celebrated but no less influential history produced 3 5 years later. to The shifting metaphors of scholarly discourse about mi gration convey the essence of the new approach: we now understand that migrants do not move as solo adventurers but rather as actors linked to associates here and there, with the ties lubricating and struc turing their transition from one society to the next. Rephrased in the jargon favored by the scholarly literature, the connections that span immigrant communities constitute a source of social capital, provid ing social structures that facilitate action-most important, the search for jobs and the dri"e to acquire the skills and other resources needed to get started in a ne," ,yorld and, with luck, subsequently move up the economic ladder. 11 By comrast, social isolation appears to charac terize the contemporary urban underclass, its members lacking strong ties to others who have the basel:ne resources needed for successful insertion into the economy and all the other roles associated with reg ular work.
As concept, the underclass has infiltrated deeply into the vocabulary of contemporary social scientific thinking about urban America and its residents. But its conceptual status seems almost certainly less than sci entific: it provides a seemingly neurral label for categorizing undesir ables, all the while obscuring interest in the nature of the domination they experience, as dearly implied by the term. After all, there is no un derdass without an "overclass," but the latter somehow never gets mentioned in the discussion. Fortunately for them, immigrants enjoy some degree of inoculation from application of the term. The under class, as concept, has the rhetorical convenience of providing a non racialized tag for African Americans, a more stigmatized group than immigrants, who occupy a far more accepted role in the American imagination and dream. On the other hand, that more privileged status seems contingent on the willingness and ability, at least among low skilled immigrants, to continue working at difficult, poorly remuner ated jobs and under conditions that most Americans will not acceptP For the most part, immigrants appear to be avoiding this danger, al though some groups are more marginal to the economy than others, and many commentators have raised a red flag concerning the future of immigrant children.
worries have already stimulated some ana lysts to label immigrants as a potential underclass, as suggested by chapter s in this book. Anxiety about the prospects the least-skilled immigrants is far from unreasonable, yet one must note that the avail ability and application of the underclass category is itself a source of additional liability.
Assimilation
At the top of the immigration research agenda is the question of how the newcomers change after they have arrived.
conventional wis dom, both academic and popular, says that immigrants should change by the American mainstream. concept of assimila tion stands as a shorthand for this point of view.
Although it is the point of departure from which almost all scholarly assessments begin, this particular perspective necessitates a skeptical look. "Assimilation" is surely a peculiar scholarly concept, resonating with that normative vision of national life prescribes a direct rela tionship between the individual and the unmediated by ties of an ethnic type. Not surprisingly, it sets up an artificial contrast between immigrants depicted as distinctive from the start and a national self, imagined in homogeneous terms-that is, as mainstream-whereas in fact it is riven by all sorts of divisions. That immigrants are surely dif ferent is beyond dispute, and yet the concept of assimilation hides the degree to which crucial differences are created through the process of migration and by members of the host group. To mention the most ob vious example, farmers and factory owners deliberately and systemati cally recruit migrant laborers precisely because the latter have different orientations to work than do native-born workers; at the same time, the stigmatized conditions in which migrant workers find themselves gener ate unfavorable stereotypes that impede subsequent mobility.13 And the dictionary provides a more expansive definition of assimilation than the social science literature allows-namely, acceptance, a condition that implies change on the part of dominants, not just newcomers. How ever, the scholarly literature on assimilation has yet to conceptualize the mechanisms whereby dominants might exclude immigrants and perpetuate the disadvantages that they experience.
For the purposes of discussion, we might do better by shifting to a more descriptive level and making the terms of discussion more modest. It is probably enough to ask whether immigrants are making progress, though even here complexities of varying sorts quickly arise. In a sense, everyone agrees that newcomers typically begin with a set of liabilities: problems in speaking English, skills or credentials that may not be ap propriate to the U.S. labor market, and a lack of exposure to the ways of American society, including the signals and credentials that tell em ployers that a foreign-born worker can indeed do the job as he or she suggests. Over time, these difficulties are eased. As settlement deepens, immigrants, regardless of skill level, see their earnings and occupational status improve. If we focus on absolute rates of progress, the line is pitched at an upward angle.
But most of the scholarly and policy debate focuses on relative rates of progress, and rightly so. In a sense, all of our social indicators are measures of relath'e \vell-being; that a person living below the poverty line in the United StaIes might enjoy considerable comfort as compared to someone from an impoyerished Third or Fourth World country is beside the point. ~foreowr, the Yery notion of assimilation, problem atic as it is, implies a conwrgence between immigrant and host country expectations: over time, and certainly their children, are increasingly likely to aspire to conditions enjoyed by the average resident of the United States.
In this light, the research consensus has moved from an optimistic to a somewhat pessimistic vie\\". The earliest, most influential view derived from the work of the labor economist Barry Chiswick. Analyzing data from the I970 census, and thus comparing the very earliest of the "new immigrants" with their counterparts who arrived during the I9 50S and earlier, Chiswick found that immigrants began with a disadvantage, but their prospects quickly improved. After the passage of roughly 20 years, immigrants' earnings surpassed those of natives of the same eth nic background. As implied by the terms of comparison, not every group progressed at the same rate; although Mexican immigrants ad vanced more slowly than newcomers from Europe, over time, they did better than comparable Mexican Americans.1 4 Chiswick's optimistic view was quickly challenged by his fellow economist, George Borjas, who objected on methodological and sub stantive grounds. IS Chiswick extrapolated immigrant rates of progress based on an analysis of a cross section of the U.s. population taken at a single point in time. Controlling for other background characteristics, he contrasted immigrants living in the United States for, let's say, 5 years with those residing in the country for longer durations of IO, I 5, or more years. But this comparison assumed that the characteristics both measured and unmeasured-of recent immigrant cohorts would essentially resemble those of their predecessors, making experience of the earlier immigrants a good predictor of the outcomes of those who arrived later.
Borjas quite reasonably questioned this assumption. lvligrations are known to be selective: moving is hardest at the outset, making those with the highest skills, greatest resources, best connections, and greatest propensity for risk the most likely to spearhead a move. Over time, se lectivity diminishes, increasing the probability that later arrivals 'will compare unfavorably with the pioneers who established the initial beachheads. Moreover, the U.S. immigration system changed, starting in the mid-I960s, in ways that lowered the barriers to migration, fur ther reducing selectivity. Thus, contrary to Chiswick's assumption, it seemed unlikely that the trajectories of earlier immigrants would pro vide a reliable guide to the experience of more recent arrivals.
Although Borjas confirmed that immigrants do indeed move up oyer time, he also demonstrated that the rate of progress was falling. Analyz ing the I980 census, he showed that the newcomers of the I9'"'OS were moving ahead more slowly than those of the I9605, who, in turn, were marching forward less briskly than those of the prior decade. Borjas subsequently extended the same analysis, with analogous though still more depressing results, to the I990 census. Most important, Borjas showed that recent immigrants do not catch up with, let alone surpass, their statistical counterparts among native-born workers. And there is a still more disturbing twist: as the comparison pairs native-born and foreign-born workers of the same ethnicity, it tells us that Mexican im migrants, more than a quarter of all immigrant workers, suffer from a growing gap relative to Mexican Americans, themselves a disadvantaged group.16
Borjas's results have been challenged and criticized, but they have largely carried the day,17 as evidenced by their acceptance and endorse ment in the National Research Council's highly influential 1997 report The New Americans. As Mark Ellis shows in chapter 4 of this book, consideration of the distinctive regional concentration of the immigrant population puts the basic Borjas finding in a very different light. Immi grants are lagging behind natives, Ellis tells us, not simply because their personal characteristics reduce their competitiveness in the labor mar ket but because of trends in the particular labor markets where immi grants cluster. Nonetheless, Ellis also underscores one of Borjas's most fundamental points:
gap separating new immigrants, especially the low skilled, from natives is growing.
That gap now takes on a dimension not present in the earlier stages of the immigration debate. The new immigration began at the tail end of a period of historically high equality; since then, the distribution of wealth and income has shifted in ways that make the United States a far more unequal society than it once was. For immigrants, that change carries significant peril: real wages among less-skilled workers, of all ethnic stripes, have taken a very sharp hit over the past two I decades. Less-skilled immigrants are striving to make it in a labor market oversupplied with poorly educated workers and in which the . . terms of compensation have shifted sharply against the less skilled. IS \ Not all immigrant groups are equally affected by this change; indeed, for some, especially those among whom highly educated, scientific professionals predominate, the burgeoning demand for highly edu cated labor is good ne'\n. But the groups with a more distinctly prole · tarian cast, most notabl\' the ~lexicans, are facing a structure that may well impede their rate of upward movement. The new economy has done nothing to dampen demand for less-skilled immigrant • labor, nor to dislodge immigrants from the places that · they have established, as \ye shall see in chapter 3. And immigrants' children may not face pressures of equal severity, as suggested in chapter 8. Still, the facts of the case-high levels of regionally concen trated migration occurring at a time of greater inequality-provide grounds for concern.
Ethnic Persistence
Although the literature on the economic progress of immigrants quickly becomes preoccupied with matters of technical detail-as suggested by the terms of the debate between Chiswick and Borjas described ear lier-its substantive concern is quite straightforward. For economists, "assimilation" can be innocently understood as the process by which. the economic welfare of immigrants comes to converge with that of na tives. Economists certainly understand that any trend toward economic convergence yields related shifts in patterns of residence, association; and self-identity, but their concerns principally involve the dollars and cents of the matter. The sociological literature casts a wider net. Indeed, the canonical texts on the topic were mainly preoccupied with the social aspects of as similation, at the expense of the economic dimension. Sociologists now agree that_economic progress is the linchpin of assimilation, driving all other shifts in the social structure of ethnicity. Still, it is easy enough to tie together the possible pieces of the package. At the outset, immigrants stick together. Lacking resources and the know-how needed to function beyond the ethnic community, they depend on one another, a depen dency that leads newcomers to settle in neighborhoods densely popu lated with immigrants and to work in the ethnic niches where their com patriots cluster. Over time, the type of economic assimilation described by economists diminishes dependency, as immigrant options increase . As settlers move away from the occupations and neighborhoods of greatest immigrant density, their e.x:P()sllre probabilities change. In turn, they are increasingly likely to encounter out-group members, and in contexts that encourage closer associations. While the immigrants them selves are likely to retain strong in-group attachments, their children are unlikely to share ties of equal intensity. Thus, the social networks of im migrant descendants from the second generation on increasingly cross ethnic lines, leading to new forms of affiliation and identity that eventu ally replace those characteristic of the original immigrant group.19
This volume, in contrast to the earlier work reported in our book Ethnic Los Angeles, does relatively little with the sociological interest in these broader dimensions of ethnic change; such important topics as residential integration, intermarriage, and language shifts remain out side of our purview. 2o Rather, we focus, perhaps narrowly, on th~,la_bor market aspects of the immigrant experience.
Nonetheless, many of the broader concerns raised by the sociological literature are echoed in the chapters that follow. As noted previously, the traditional approach assumes that immigrants begin in occupational and residential clusters, in which propinquity to coethnics promotes !continued interaction within ethnic circle. However, the search for opportunity soon leads to dispersion along one dimension, if not sev eral, lowering exposure to ethnic insiders. Thus, established perspec tive emphasizes the discontinuities that are created as immigrants re spond, in individualistic fashion, to options that arise as integration deepens.
But that view reflects the intellectual context in which sociologists have framed and elaborated the concept of assimilation. On the one hand, the canonical account of assimilation emerged in a period very different from today, when immigration had reached its lowest level, and not even the most farsighted of social scientists could imagine the events that would transpire after 1965. Under those circumstances, an effort to illuminate the integration of ethnic groups in American society could be decoupled from a sociology of immigration itself. On the other hand, classical thinking about assimilation bears the clear traces of modernization theory, with its assumption that ethnic ties were cultur ally based vestiges of older forms of social organization, bound to wither as immigrants acculturated and substituted universal for partic ular loyalties.
By contrast, the sociology of immigration of the type that has emerged over the past 20 years, with its emphasis on social capital, outa trajectory of a very different type. Notwithstanding disagree ment over a host of particulars, most scholars now agree that immigra tion is a fundamentally social process, by the connections that link settlers to ne,vcomers. Seedbed ne\vcomers may move without help and tumble into jobs more or less by accident, but they soon find them selves in a position to assist new arriyals. As long as the immigrants are few and their resources only close associates are able to access help. But the buildup a population inevitably expands and diversifies the types of social networks an immigrant community includes. Greater numbers create basis for institutions, both formal and informal, that bring immigran:s in recurrent, systematic, and more durable ways. The process ot migration creates the seeds out of which a new ethnic social structure grows; defensive needs-the aware ness of alterability, the hostility displayed by outsiders-further hasten and intensify this development. 2l
Thus, social structures emerge out of migration because of the prob lems they help the migrants resolve; that they also serve the uses of out siders with whom the migrants come into contact provides a further fillip. A now massive and familiar body of literature tells us that the embedding of migration in ,social net;~ork'hmproves the quality of in formation circulated in immlgrantcommunities and generates trust that serves as social capital among newcomers, who are often deprived and rarely able to access helping mechanisms available to the mainstream. 22 As it happens, the predilections of immigrants match the preferences of employers, who try to reproduce the characteristics of the workers they already have and continue to dip into the immigrant hiring pool. Once established, the social organization and social relations of the immi grant community operate with an independent effect. Consequently, the web of ties linking immigrants to one another shapes and constrains their ability to pursue opportunity, creating information fields and mo bility channels that structure the fabric of ethnic life in durable and significant ways. And thus, unlike the older approach of assimilation, with its emphasis on social discontinuity, the newer approach accents those processes leading to social reproduction .
This new perspective appears in the literature in any number of forms, most notably in such concepts as the ethnic enclave, ethnic economy, and ethnic niche, all of which are attempts to understand the characteristics and consequences of the distinctive clusters that immigrants establish in the economy. As discussed in greater detail in chapter 7, most of the sociological work in this vein has focused on those concentrations characterized by high levels of immigrant self employment. Researchers have been particularly interested in the Cuban ethnic enclave in Miami, where immigrants are not only work ing on their own account but appear to be employing a considerable number of their coethnics. The various chapters in this volume pro vide a view of the Cuban ethnic enclave that clashes with much of the literature, a point to which we will return in the concluding chapter. Whatever can be said about the Cuban ethnic enclave, the type of sit uation that it purportedly represents is relatively uncommon: for the most part, immigrants in business are working on their own with few, if any, nonkin employees. And where entrepreneurship takes spectac ular form, as among Koreans, Iranians, or Israelis, for example, the drive to set up one's own business dries up the ethnic labor supply; thus, recourse to nonethnic labor is not an uncommon aspect of the immigrant business scene.2 3 Despite the emphasis on self-employment, it seems reasonable to contend that it represents a single instance of the broader phenomenon denoted by the concept of the ethnic niche. As argued earlier in this chapter, the network-based nature of migration and employment sys tems funnel and cluster immigrants into specific economic activities. Al though these clusters sometimes entail self-employment, they more fre quently involve occupational and industrial specializations in which immigrants find themselves working as wage and salaried employees. The lessons revealed by my earlier work on New York and Los Angeles show that the tendency to concentrate in ethnic niches is a distinguish ing trait of the immigrant experience, characterizing migrant streams of various types. 24 As in the earlier work, the chapters in this book define an ethnic niche as an occupational or industrial specialization in which a group is overrepresented by at least 50 percent. Chapters 6 and 7 pro vide ample additional intellectual context, as well as all the details in volved in operationalizing the niche concept.
The Second Generation
Migration is an arduous experience, best undertaken by those ready to run risks and prepared to struggle to make it under adverse conditions. For that reason, immigrants have a relatively youthful profile; they ar rive as adults but at that stage in adult life when they are either bearing or bringing up young children. Consequently immigration soon yields a second, even more fateful, result: the emergence of the second genera tion, a population categorized as children of foreign-born parents who are either born in the United States or born abroad and brought to the United States at a very young age.
Questions about the future of the second generation were common early in the twentieth cenrun-. At the time, contemporaries lacked the knowledge we now possess: they could not imagine that the children and grandchildren of foreign-born, unskilled workers would eventually climb up the totem pole, helped by the New Deal, the GI Bill, Veterans Administration (VA) mortgages, and a system of high wages and re duced inequality. Rather, the knowledgeable observers of eight to nine decades ago fretted over those de\-e!opments that they could readily ob serve: more good jobs required extended levels of education, and the children of immigrant workers seemed unwilling to stay in schoo1. 25 In the end, those anxieties ,,-ere for naught: the descendants of the eastern and southern European immigrants who arrived at the turn of the twentieth centurv have now climbed to the pinnacle of American " society, or thereabouts. But our leading researchers think it unlikely that a similar scenario awaits the offspring of the new, late-twentieth century immigration. In their view, the immigrants of the turn of the twentieth century had the advantage of sharing a common European heritage with the then-dominant white Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASPs) and that blunted discrimination's
The old factory-based economy also allowed for a multigenerational move up the totem pole. Immigrant children could do better than their parents if they stayed in the educational system through high school, after which well-paid man ufacturing jobs would await them. The third generation would con tinue on through college and beyond, completing the move from ped dler to plumber to professor, the dirty secret being that the wages of brain work did not always rival the earnings enjoyed in the skilled crafts.
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According to the hypothesis of segmented assimilation, a term coined by Alejandro Partes and Min Zhou (who has also authored chapter 8 in this book, on the new second generation), the offspring of today's poorly educated immigrants are likely to experience a very dif ferent fateP low-skilled immigrants of the turn of the twenty-first century, visibly identifiable and coming everywhere but Europe, enter a mainly white society still not cured of its racist afflictions. The immigrants arrive willing to do the jobs that natives will not, but the children want more; not clear is whether the children's careers can live up to "their U.S.-acquired aspirations. "28 The conundrum of the con temporary second generation is heightened by the continuing transfor mation of the U.S. economy. Although low-skilled jobs persist, occupa tional segmentation has "reduced the opportunities for incremental upward mobility through well-paid, blue-collar positions." The advent of the hourglass economy confronts the immigrant children with a cruel choice: either acquire the college and other advanced degrees needed to move into the professional and managerial elite or else accept the same menial jobs to which the first generation was consigned. But the immi grants' children may simply say, "no thanks," in which case a new un derclass is in the making.
In her chapter Min Zhou draws on a completely new data source to address the educational and employment trajectories experienced by the emerging second generation, and there is no need for me to preempt her message here. But as I dissent from the overall program, a few cau tionary words may be in order. On the one hand, one might not have expected the discussions of immigrant children's prospects to have turned so pessimistic so quickly, given the distinctive economic charac teristics of the post-I965 immigrants. As I have already noted, socio economic diversity is a salient feature of the new immigration, quite in contrast to the situation among the immigrants of 1890-1920, who were concentrated at the bottom of the occupational distribution. In particular, high-skilled immigrants have played a modest but significant role in immigration to the United States since the enactment of the Hart-Celler Act in 1965.
Moreover, there is little question that many, possibly even most, im migrant children are heading upward, as exemplified by the large num ber of Chinese, Korean, Indian, and other students of Asian origin en rolled in the nation's leading universities, some the children of workers, others the descendants of immigrants who moved right into the middle class. This rapid ascent evokes parallels with the past, most clearly the first-and second-generation Jews who began appearing at City College and then Columbia, Harvard, and other prestigious schools in numbers that discomfited the then dominant WASPs. As Stephen Steinberg pointed out some years ago, it was the Jews' good fortune to have moved to America just when the educational system was expanding and moving away from its classical past and to have converged on the Northeast, where opportunities to pursue schooling were particularly good. 29 But even so, schleppers greatly outnumbered scholars, and the proportion of Jews who made their way to Harvard or its proletarian cousin, the City College of New York (CCNY), was dwarfed by those who moved ahead as skilled workers, clerks, or small business owners. In this light, the Asian advance into higher education remains phenom enal; in the Los Angeles region, for example, 18-to 24-year-olds in every Asian group (Vietnamese immigrants who arrived in the United States after the age of 10 included) attend college at a rate that exceeds that of native-born whites, ivith native-born Asians leagues ahead of native-born whites on this count. And, ironically, the current back lash against affirmative action seems likely to accelerate rather than re verse this trend-quite a different turn of events than that which tran spired in the Ivy League 70 years ago. 31 On the other hand, there is good reason to believe that the children of the immigrant working poor will undergo a rather different and far less brilliant fate. It is not simply the case that the earnings of less skilled immigrants are lagging behind. One must also remember that their households are often large, containing many children, which de ::cresses per capita income and increases the likelihood that the children "",·ill grow up in poverty-bad news, as we know from the large library of research demonstrating that growing up in poverty is associated with decreased school achievement. Even so, the projection of an underclass seems to involve quite a stretch, and not simply because the un derclass concept is of dubious value, as I have already argued. The ghetto underclass may be the result of social isolation, but that term hardly applies to the environments in which the children of immigrants grow up. As we shall see in chapter 3, employment rates among low skilled immigrants are generally impressive, indeed sufficiently so to make work normative (granted some possible exceptions, such as the Dominicans in New York). The population density of persons with jobs is itself a source of social capital, improving the quantity and quality of job-related information and embedding job seekers in informal net works that transmit skills once jobs are acquired. Is it unreasonable to assume that the deep embedding of immigrant networks in the labor market has no salutary effect on the opportunities available to new comers' children? It is also worth recalling that the embedding of immigrant communi ties in the labor market at least in part, a response to employers' fa vorable views of the work ethic and behavior of the foreign-born; for that reason, one can expect that immigrant children are received quite differently than were the offspring of the African American migrants to the cities of the East and Midwest. The penetration of immigrant net works is also now very deep. To take the Los Angeles case, which I know particularly well, although there are still plenty of immigrant sweepers and sewers, there are also quite a few foremen and skilled workers, which in turn provides the second generation with access to higher-level job opportunities. Because immigration itself generates ample needs for bilingual speakers (whether in hospitals, department stores, or factories), it creates positions for which children of immi grants are ideally suited. Consequently, anxiety over prospects for sec ond-generation immigrants may be warranted, but the more dire sce narios should be assessed with a good deal of care.
Making It in the Capitals of Immigrant America: An Overview
Having filled in intellectual background, I use the remainder of this chapter to offer a taste of the topics addressed and arguments advanced in the chapters to follow. Chapter 2, which I have coau thored with Jennifer Lee, further sets the stage by reviewing immigra tion trends, both in the nation at large and within the five urban re gions on which this book focuses. We also highlight the distinctive settlement pattern developed by the immigrants as they have put down roots. We argue that the action takes place in America's five leading immigrant destinations, since the immigrants have become more regionally concentrated over the past several decades. But these ! key immigrant regions are not of a piece; rather, they differ strikingly , in the skill composition of their immigrants, the diversity of their im migrant flows, and the timing of arrival, disparities that are height ened by divergent trajectories of urban economic change. Taking a comparative view of immigrants in their regional concentrations, we highlight similarities and differences entirely ignored by the litera ture's focus on change at a national level or overlooked by the case study work linked to individual places.
Most of the literature on the transformation of the urban economies studied in this book emphasizes the extraordinary employment difficul ties experienced by less-skilled members of native-born minority groups. But immigrants-often poorly educated, recently arrived, and lacking in English fluency-are finding jobs, and doing so at remark ably high rates. Chapter 3 focuses on this paradox and its broader ramifications, emphasizing the importance of comparisons that take into account gender and nativity status. Although less-skilled immi grant men may be more likely to be employed than their African Amer ican counterparts they soon discover that finding "adequate employ ment"-in terms of compensation or hours-is far more difficult. On the flip side, African American men have a more arduous time finding a job but are more likely to find themselves adequately employed once they find one. By contrast, the persons at greatest risk are less-skilled immigrant women, who encounter many more employment problems than their white and African American counterparts and for whom na tivity universally depresses employment and often depresses employ ment adequacy. Thus, immigrams may have ample access to social cap ital, as the literature suggests, but those resources are not available to all. Even immigrants who benefit from the connections that link them to employers find that those ties \\-ork less efficiently in moving them to jobs of adequate quality.
Chapter 4, by Mark Ellis, takes up the same theme and inquires about immigrant progress by comparing wage trends of foreign-and native-born workers in America's five urban immigrant regions. As I have noted, immigration scholars have largely concluded that immi grants are falling behind their native-born counterparts. But as Ellis points out, this consensus rests on analyses done entirely at the national level, whereas the bulk of immigrants are living in the five regions that are the focus of this book. Furthermore, these are places where natives are relatively underrepresented, and the economic structure is shifting in ways quite different from the changes transpiring in the nation as a whole. Ellis finds that the regional comparison reveals a very different portrait of the widening economic bifurcation between the foreign-and native-born than national trends indicate. At a national level, factors related to the national-origin and skill composition of the immigrant population explain much of the gap between the native-and foreign born. But in the leading immigrant destinations, immigrant disadvan tage results mainly from the restructuring of regional economies, mak ing it more difficult for the foreign-born to translate their skills into decent wages. Compared to the native-born, whose wages in these re gions are even higher than they are nationally, the disparity between the foreign-and native-born increases dramatically. Ellis points out that the differential change in wage structures implies that the native-and foreign-born work in dual labor markets whose lines of segmentation have cemented over the past decade.
Next we turn to William A. V. Clark's chapter on immigrant poverty and the emergence of an immigrant underclass, Though noting the bifurcated immigrant population of highly educated newcomers working in the high end of the occupational spectrum and their poorly educated and low-skilled counterparts trying to rise out of poverty, Clark argues that immigrant poverty levels are cause for concern. He finds that in the five regions, immigrants overall are doing much better than the native-born black population but worse than the native-born white population, with only four exceptions-Los Angeles, Phoenix, Houston, and Denver-where both native-born populations have lower poverty rates than the foreign-born. RegioI1_aLcliHerences abound, with the most vulnerable groups varying by place and ethnic origin: Central Americans in Chicago, Mexicans in Miami, and Russians and South east Asians in Los Angeles. The critical factor in escaping poverty, Clark finds, is securing employment, a daunting task given immi grants' low skills .
The question of whether and how immigrants affect the employment prospects of African Americansnils-lJeen a central concern for academics in many disciplines. Chapter 6, by Kelson Lim, this question by comparing African American and immigrant niches over a two decade period: . In 1970 African Americans and immigrants converged in the same niches, but by 1990 African Americans dominated niches in which immigrants barely penetrated. Did immigrants push African Americans out of some niches, or were they instead pushed up or pulled into better niches by factors bearing little or no relationship to im migration? Lim's chapter argues for the latter of these possibilities, point ing to the endogenous forces that have transformed African American niches in all five immigrant regions, and in remarkably the same way. On the one hand, immigrants made inroads into those African American niches marked by low status and subordination-for example, jobs in the hotel industry or domestic service. By contrast, African Americans made use of their higher levels of education to penetrate better quality niches in the public sector, consequently diminishing effects of immigrant com petition. African Americans have been pulled up, not out.
I continue the analysis of the ethnic niche in chapter 7, coauthored with Claudia Der-Martirosian, in which we switch the focus from African Americans to immigrants. Although literature has been true to its assimilationist bias, viewing the ethnic niche as a transi tional phenomenon limited to new arrivals and low-skilled groups, we find the opposite to be true. Notwithstanding the important differ ences among the five urban regions, ethnic niches stand out as a char >w~, •• acteristic of almost every immigrant group In all five locales-high skilled low skilled, refugees and entrepreneurial types-with con , centration persisting even as immigrant cohorts put down roots. \'{Te also take the discussion of niches in a new direction by inquiring into the noneconomic characteristics of ethnic niches, with an emphasis on the cognitive skills required by niche jobs and the physical circum stances under which the jobs get done. We show that although skill sorts immigrants into "good" and "bad" niches, ethnicity works as a fundamental structuring such that groups occupy niches of the same type, regardless locale. In general, we conclude that concen tration, not dispersion, is the coad to economic mobility and the quest for advancement takes a rather than an individual form. But we do find one exception to the broader pattern: Cubans in Miami, who, conrran' to the accepted conventional wis dom, show relatively low of ethnic niching and have established niches of exceptionally low quality.
Chapter 8, by Min Zhou, focuses on the prospects of mobility for raday's second generation. Zhou poses the following question: Are the offspring of today's immigrant generation facing an unprecedented sec ond generation decline? Most of the second generation has not yet reached adulthood, but significant numbers are now leaving the parental household, with diverse trajectories emerging as young adult immigrant offspring leave school and enter the labor market. In general, the second generation is surpassing the first on a number of indicators including high school graduation rates. Asserting that mobility is not re ducible ra class differences, Zhou argues that ethnicity seems to be ex erting its own effect-accelerating upward progress for some while hindering mobility for others. Whether the second generation'S expecta tions will be met depends on two factors: (I) educational credentials and school-acquired skills and (2) ethnic connections. Zhou's chapter casts doubt on the scenario of second-generation decline since raday's secondgeneration is surpassing the first generation's progress. However, she also cautions that the population is diverse, as already manifest in the mobility patterns; Asians are moving up the ranks most rapidly, Mexi cans most slowly, and other Hispanics and blacks somewhere in be tween. What Min Zhou and Carl Bankston find in their work Growing, Up American is applicable: groups that maintain a distinctive identity, and social structures that promote continued cohesion have advantages· in getting ahead. 32 Balkanization," Urban Studies 32 [1995] : 733-757) has found a negative cor relation between immigration and net internal migration, which he has inter preted as immigration-induced "flight." By contrast, Richard Wright, Mark Ellis, and Michael Reibel have argued that natives' tendency to leave areas of high immigration densities reflects not so much a response to immigration as -such but rather to other shifts in the economic structure of those places ("The -Linkage between Immig?ation and Internal Migration in Large :Metropolitan ··Areas in the United States," Economic Geography 73, no. 2 
[I992]:
Although the body of literature on this subject is already large and rapidly
Chapter 9
CONCLUSION Immigration and the Remaking of Urban America

Roger Waldinger
This book has sought to tell the story of the new immigrant America and its urban capitals. That newcomers are urban bound is neither a sur prise nor an accident. Although the immigrant geography of the United States at the turn of the twenty-first century barely resembles the pattern observed a century ago, the basic tendency to converge on a limited number of places remains much the same. Nor has the basic motivation for clustering changed. Networks, as we have emphasized throughout this book, lubricate the process of migration: the connections between veterans and newcomers attract the most recent arrivals to those places where the old-timers are well established. Rephrased in the jargon of the social sciences, i immigrant settlement is path dependent,! and the deci sions of earlier immigrants exercise a profound effect on the options available to those whose departure from the old country comes later. The tendency to cluster lies at the heart of the immigrant phenomenon itself. But geography and history influence the particular clusters toward which immigrants head. In a sense, the new geography of contemporary immigrant America reflects the resettlement of the American population Itself. New York and Chicago still rank high in the hierarchy of urban places, but they no longer dominate as they once did. Instead, the na tion's center of gravity has shifted away from the cities of the Northeast and Midwest, where immigrants of the turn of the twentieth century 308 m ci ac p a n th T ar u d g T d to h th th st ci tr w w a c th ro S n b th th e h th massed. Not just the foreign-born but also millions of natives have de cided that a better life is to be found in Florida and California. Still, the accidents of history-the Cuban Revolution, the collapse of U.S.-sup ported regimes in Southeast Asia, the initiation of the Bracero program and its subsequent abolition, civil wars in Central America-steered the newcomers in the particular directions they have taken.
Thus, immigrants have an urban fate. Does it matter? answer to that question takes three parts.
The Urban Dimension. The literature tells us that today's immigrants are people who just happened to have settled in the nation's larpest urban regions. But this book puts things in a very different light(the distinctive characteristics of the urban context in the key immigrant r~. gions shape the very structure of opportunity that newcomers confrontl The capitals of immigrant America do not stand out just as concentra· tions of the foreign-born. They also happen to be places where the shift 1 toward the new, knowledge-based economy is most advanced. As we have noted, not every urban region has moved in this direction at quite the same pace; Miami lags behind the others, and San Francisco leads the pack. But in each place, the structure of skills bears a very similar stamp: compared to rest of the United States, the leading immigra tion regions display a prominent tilt toward jobs for which advanced training is required and away from jobs of an easy-entry sort and for which the required skills can be picked up as one goes.
But if today's immigrant regions are dispensing with the activities for which immigrants are usually deployed, then how to account for their attraction to the foreign·born? Providing a full answer to that query ex ceeds the scope of this chapter; for our purposes, it is enough to say that the native-born population has rearranged itself in ways that make room for its newly found immigrant neighbors. Elsewhere in the United States, the native-born population can be found on all rungs of the eco nomic ladder. In the capitals of immigrant America, however, native born workers are an unusually well-educated lot, possessing the skills that allow them to concentrate in the topmost jobs. The emergence of this high-skilled contingent may partly result from the decision of less educated natives to respond to immigration by voting with their feet, heading for places where competition for jobs is not quite so intense. In the context of immigrants, however, accounting for the native-born pattern seems less important than the pattern itself. Equipped with the proficiencies that employers in the growth sectors demand, native-born workers have largely vacated the low-skilled sector, providing entree to the newest Americans, for whom work at the bottom beats the alterna tives available back home.
Immigrants have plenty of opportunities to get started; unfortu nately, they begin in a context particularly inimical to those among them with relatively low skills. The conventional wisdom about immi grant progress has shifted from optimism to pessimism, largely because the most recent cohorts of newcomers are experiencing ever greater trouble in narrowing the wage gap that separates them from compara ble natives. As Mark Ellis showed in chapter 4, that conventional wis dom is largely right, but mainly for the wrong reasons. Newcomers liv ing in the capitals of immigrant America lag further behind natives than their counterparts elsewhere in the nation, but not for the most com monly asserted reason-that their skills are inferior to those who have settled elsewhere. While the declining selectivity of urban-bound migra tion streams accounts for some of the disparity that expanded during the I980s, that factor leaves much of the gap unexplained. The source of the problem of catching up, rather, lies in the new era of inequality in which we are living and the particularly severe form it takes in the re gions to which immigrants have moved. While today's economy has re duced the earnings of the skilled of all ethnic stripes, pay structures in the capitals of immigrant America have become more unequal than anywhere else. Nloreover, the characteristics of native and immigrant workers have been changing in ways that unevenly equip natives and immigrants to benefit from the change in the structure of demand. Na tives have been enhancing their skills just at a time when compensation for the better educated has improved. While immigrants' skills have also improved, they have advanced too slowly and have begun from too Iowa base-exposing them to the severely downward wage pressures at work in the low-skilled sector. Consequently, as Ellis explains, ·changes in the urban wage structure largely account for the declining relative wages of immigrant men and women, increasing the socioeco 'nomic gap between them and their native-born counterparts.
Urban or Ethnic Effects?
Compared to the rest of the United States, then, the capitals of immigrant America appear to offer a troubled launching pad: here, the nature of the opportunity structure impedes the upward movement of less-skilled immigrants in ways unlikely to be repli cated in other areas. But if we confine ourselves to the key immigrant re gions on which this book is focused, the ethnic factor seems to be a more important influence than the specificities of any particular place.
Thus, the stories in the two chapters on ethn~c niches (chapters 6 and 7) find little interurban variatiol1..As Der-Martirosian and I found in our chapteron immigrant niche (chapter 7), each group tends to oc cupy niches of a similar type regardless of where its members settle. Re visiting the figures in that chapter confirms this conclusion, as the spread among points represents an ethnic rather than an urban effect. l , Most groups are tightly clustered, which means a common ethnic factor I " exercises the principal influence on specialization. There is relatively lit-I de variation from one urban region to another, and the same pattern of concentration emerges along each of the indicators of job quality whether, for example, social skills or physical conditions-examined. True, not all groups line up in the same neatly clustered way, but only one group stands out for its high level of interurban variation. Cubans in Miami follow a particularly unique pattern, to be discussed at greater length in the section that follows.
One might argue that this interpretation mistakes ethnic influences for those more powerful forces affecting the mode of immigrant incor poration. As Portes and Rumbaut convincingly argued in Immigrant America, a complex of factors relating to group characteristics and host society reactions channel immigrants into particular segments of the labor market and tend to keep them there. I But this perspective can eas ily be reconciled with the argument just developed. One could rephrase our conclusions by saying that different patterns of incorporation cor respond to a basic variation in niche type: while labor migrants consis tently occupy niches of low quality, entrepreneurial or professional im-i migrants gravitate toward more favorable niches. And one need not confine the analysis to polar types; for example, the contrast between Koreans, on the one hand, and Asian Indians and Filipinos, on the other, highlights the distinctive characteristics of these migration streams of higher-skilled immigrants. Korean niches not only compare unfavorably with Asian Indian and Filipino dusters in terms of quality but also illuminate the particular combination of traits-modest levels of substantive complexity and high levels of social skills-required by those employed in small business niches. However, a comparison of Fil ipinos and Asian Indians shows the degree to which ethnicity affects niche characteristics, even when the two groups greatly resemble one another in the mode of incorporation. And as an analytic construct, mode of incorporation does not seem sufficiently tight to capture the full range of variation that we find: Anglophone Carib beans turn out to occupy a distinctive niche that cannot be easily placed in the heuristic scheme that Portes and Rumbaut propose.
Der-Martirosian and I examine a broad range of groups during a particular period; by contrast, Lim mainly focuses on one group but traces change over time. Lim's concern does not involve an immigrant group but rather African Americans and the evolving overlap between their niches and the clusters established by immigrants. Still, Lim's find ings provide powerful evidence of the structuring role of ethnicity, though not in a mechanistic or deterministic way. While African Amer ican niches in our five immigrant regions were similar in 1970, urban influences then stood out in considerable relief. As of 1990, by contrast, urban differences had largely disappeared, replaced by a pattern of striking isomorphism in which African Americans occupied the very same niches, regardless of place.
Describing Lim's findings as evidence of ethnic effects does little more than provide a label; it falls a good deal short of explanation, leaving "ethnic" as a black box whose contents remain largely ob scured. Reference to networks provides some illumination: the web of ties linking members of an ethnic population to one another and constrains their ability to pursue opportunity, creating information fields and mobility channels that structure the fabric of ethnic life in ways that produce a tendency toward clustering. But it is not clear why networks would generate such similar results across a series of places. Nor is it quite certain why they would yield like effects at various reaches of the occupational spectrum, so that workers might be more dependent on social connections but professionals less so. Thus a sup plementary explanation might invoke the concept of "parallel action": a process whereby persons sharing common traits respond similarly to a particular situation, seeking or selecting a niche in which their re sources are best rewarded but doing so without a master plan or in the absence of any concerted behavior. 2 Since networks span most ethnic communities, these connections might subsequently shape clustering with even minimal exchanges of information and support. As Ivan Light and Edna Bonacich suggested in their work on Korean en trepreneurs, "ethnic facilitation" can involve no more than noticing the implicit signals sent when coethnics start to concentrate in fields of work or business lines that offer greater than average rewards. Factors. The turn of the twenty-first century is a bad time to be a low-skilled worker in the United States; compounding this difficulty, the disadvantages associated with immigrant status and the very low educational levels of some immigrants puts immigrants in a skill class by themselves. While the key immigrant regions turn out to be particularly bad places for less-skilled immigrants to have settled, the variations in urban structure among these places do not seem to af fect the opportunities available to the foreign-born. For example, in chapter 3, on low-skilled workers, I point out that the economic struc ture varies considerably among the three regions-Chicago, Los les, and San Francisco-in which I examine Mexican employment ex periences. Nonetheless, a basic pattern holds in all three places: education has little impact on job-holding probabilities among men, such that less-skilled Mexican immigrant men have much higher em ployment probabilities than their African American counterparts in all three places. But education sharply affects employment adequacy; skilled Mexican men pay a heavy price for their low skills, in much the same way, in all three places.
If the consequences of low-skilled status do not vary across the capi tals of immigrant America, the distribution of low-skilled immigrants does; therefore, the net of this particular source of disadvantage is felt unevenly as well. In this respect, the key place of interest is likely to be Los Angeles. As announced from the start of this book, the center of immigration has shifted from the East Coast to the West Coast, with LA significantly outpacing New York as a destination for the foreign born arrivals of the past 30 years. Los Angeles not only receives a dis proportionately large immigrant flow but also attracts a disproportion ately large group of low-skilled newcomers. If we are correct in arguing that low skills impede immigrant progress, then that obstacle will yield its most pronounced effect in LA.
But there is likely to be more. literature on labor market compe tition, which Lim reviews in chapter 6, provides at best limited evidence that immigrants harm the wages or employment chances of natives. As to the matter of intraimmigrant displacement, however, there is little dispute: the higher the proportion of immigrants in the labor force, the greater the downward pressure on wages. Indeed, the tendency to clus ter in niches only heightens the mismatch between supply and demand.
As we have noted throughout this book, network recruitment oper ates in such a way as to reproduce the characteristics of the existing labor force; it also creates a situation in which less-skilled immigrants find themselves crowded into the secondary labor market, from which exit proves awfully difficult. In Los Angeles, at least, employers have adapted to the increased availability of greenhorns by expanding low skilled employment opportunities. But as newcomers headed for the same industries and occupations in which kin and friends were al ready employed, they unwittingly depressed wages for all.
And the most lasting immigrant legacy takes the form of immigrant children. Across America, as Zhou notes in chapter 8, the new second generation is emerging at a very uneven pace. Overall, the second gen eration shows less of a tendency than immigrants to concentrate in the five urban on which we focus. But this pattern is largely an ani fact of age. The category of second generation still includes many per sons ages and older who continue to reside in the older urban re gions the immigrant population landed. But younger cohorts are disproportionately living today's immigrants if immigrant offspring run into problems as they attempt to get these bottlenecks will be narrowest in immigrant concentrations on which this book has focused.
Once again, the crucible is likely to be Los Angeles. Numbers ensure that the future of the new second generation will unfold, to a dispro portionate extent, on the West Coast. Zhou suggests that this new sec ond generation is unlikely to constitute a new underclass, as the most dismal scenarios on second-generation immigrants have warned. We can that the children of immigrants will acquire a good deal more schooling and advance to a place in the occupational order than their parents did.
Even so, the prospects for immigrant offspring are shaped by the resources of their parents, and their parents are disproportionately low skilled. At the household level, the difficulties children encounter are related to the level of resources parents may transmit; in Los Ange les, resources are particularly likely to be low. But context is also likely to matter. To the extent that few in an immigrant community know how to navigate the worlds of school and office, and fewer still have done so, the models to whom children can turn are unlikely to be able to effectively motivate or achievement in school. That the group of ethnic outsiders also dominates the ranks of the re working poor is a coincidence that will do nothing to improve the dominant group's view of the second generation, which is just now entering the employment scene.
; s
Miami and the Cuban "Success Story" Revisited
As I signaled in chapter I, and as authors have noted repeatedly there after, this book yields a picture of Miami and, in particular, of its Cuban residents unlikely to have been encountered elsewhere. But we did not expect to find this revisionist view ourselves; it emerged as we noted a series of anomalies, each one adding to the overall picture. Apart from a small section in chapter I, we offered no extended discus sion of the Miami situation or of the literature on .Miami and its Cuban-origin population, though references can be found in various chapters. Thus, in this section, I step back and survey the intellectual context of this particular discussion and then distill the results of the various relevant observations made in preceding chapters.
Cubans represent a relatively small share of the total U.S. foreign born and foreign-origin population, accounting for 3.6 percent of all immigrants and 2.2 percent of all immigrant offspring as of 1999. Nonetheless, Cubans are prominent in the immigration literature, probably to a disproportionate degree given their overall numerical im portance. To some extent, historical events and timing played an im portant role in bringing Cubans to the forefront. As suggested earlier, the refugee influx of I9 59 can be seen as the beginning of new im migration, and the years since then have allowed ample opportunity to develop a body of scholarly literature. A series of interesting and con troversial developments-including the Mariel crisis of 1980, the sub sequent waves of balseros, and the saga of U.S.-Cuba relations, which has affected refugee policy in changing, unpredictable, and controver sial ways-continue to attract public and scholarly attention. And Miami has proved to be a crucible of no unusual sort, its mix of Cubans, Anglos, African Americans, and Haitians providing ample op portunity for strife.
At the same time, the relevant scholarly literature has been unusually fertile, for reasons only partially explained by the intrinsic interest of the topic. The Cuban experience has been told by a particularly tal ented group of Cuban American researchers, for whom the effort at recounting and making sense of the story can be understood as an ef fort at self-understanding, among other things, of course. And whether fortuitous or not, the most prominent sociologist of contemporary immigration, Alejandro Portes, belongs to these ranks; Portes's highly influential writings have further drawn the attention of the broader scholarly community to the developments in Miami.
Although not always noted, the literature provides 1:\"10 accounts of the Cuban experience-one, linked to Portes and his associates, that provides the version that has filtered out broadly beyond the narrow group of specialists and a second, counternarrative that does not appear to have gained much notice in the larger immigration field. As reviewed briefly in chapter 7, Portes's view emphasizes the apparently successful incorporation of Cubans, with particular attention to Cuban business activities. \X1hile the explanatory account has evolved over the years, it has consistently highlighted those processes internal to the dynamics of settlement and community development. Thus, in their book on Miami, City on the Edge, Portes and his coauthor, Alex Stepick, accent the role of premigration ties and overlapping nenvork affiliations in creating both the informational base and the level of trust needed to accumulate capital, build a client base, and secure skilled help. To be sure, the ex"ter nal factor is never missing. City on the Edge also underlines the impor tance of exclusion-by the local Anglo elite-and rejection of the exiles and their dream of counterrevolution-by Washington-as factors con tributing to ethnic solidarity and community cohesion. Immigrant America, Portes's highly influential synthetic account, coauthored with Ruben Rumbaut, also develops a model of incorporation that accents the impact of the favorable "reception context" in addition to those community characteristics emphasized in City on the Edge. Nonetheless, Immigrant America does not disentangle the effects of the various forms of government support from the more general, positive ideological cli mate, and exclusion or rejection can serve only as a sufficient, not a nec essary, condition of the community-level support mechanism on which the ethnic enclave is said to rest. 4 The alternative view offers a very different interpretation of why Cubans have done so well, while also suggesting that the progress may be a good deal more uneven than the dominant account would allow. In the counternarrative, Cubans' relatively good fortune principally de rived from the unusual level of government assistance they received and only secondarily from the community-level processes of the type Portes emphasizes. In briefest compass, the alternative account tells the fol lowing story: By the time of the first exodus from Cuba, Washington had already learned that refugees in flight from their communist home lands provided a new type of immigrant, one that could be showcased as part of the symbolic conflict with the Soviet Union. From the begin ning, Cubans benefited from massive government aid, much of which initially served to resettle refugees away from Miami but some of which still managed to flow to penniless but experienced refugee en trepreneurs. And while loans from the Small Business Administration, rather than the informal mechanisms of "enforceable trust" and "bounded solidarity," sparked the crucial wave of early start-ups, the large Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) payroll maintained in Miami provided substantial cash infusions to refugees in government service and those providing services by contract.
5
In this account, then, macro political factors lie at the root of the Cuban ethnic enclave. But the counternarrative seems to suffer from an unresolved tension as it evinces skepticism about the "Cuban success story," all the while seeking to explain whatever success it can find in light of the political considerations noted. Thus, some writers note the importance of the Cuban working class and its expression in organized labor, while others point to patterns of persistent poverty and low wages.
6
But the two sides have largely conducted this debate within the same parameters-that is, the contours of Miami, where the Cuban advan tage, at least relative to other immigrant groups and African Ameri cans, cannot escape notice and therefore requires explanation. True, Portes and Bach's important book Latin Journey traced the progress of a longitudinal sample of Cuban and Mexican immigrants, but the con trast took the form of parallel rather than comparative case studies. Cubans and Nlexicans differ on too many different dimensions-class, the nature of the migration, the reception context-to determine the relative importance of community-level processes from a consideration of these two groups alone. And as noted previously, Immigrant Amer ica invokes a series of factors in its account of immigrant incorporation, but assessing the centrality of community characteristics requires a comparison with like groups that differ only on this one dimension-a requirement that naturally exceeds the scope of the effort at synthesis to which Immigrant America aspires.
Not surprisingly, then, changing the frame, as we have done in this book, also alters story. Miami turns out to be an unusual immigrant region. Geography matters, and not simply because of Caribbean connection, which itself has a more complicated consequence than much of the literature would allow. Nliami, as we have emphasized, is part of the American South, where African Americans have consistently faced disadvantages, especially when compared to the other places that serve as America's key immigrant destinations. The political economy of the South, and not just Miami's peculiar history as a vacation spot, makes for a distinctive economic structure: Miami is a low-wage re gion, where the nature of the economy itself limits the potential for earnings growth. However glorious the progress of any particular group within this context, the place exercises its own constraints. Cursed with an off-center location, linked-albeit as a key node-to a peripheral region of the world economy, weak in manufacturing, and limited in the size of the professional and advanced services sector, Miami simply lacks the opportunities available in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. As a second-order urban area, Miami lacks the full range of economic specializations evident in its larger counterparts.
The Caribbean location, combined with the arrival of the well educated, entrepreneurial component of the Cuban refugee stream, helped propel Miami to its role as commercial entrepot for the entire region. But that same location meant that those likely to migrate there would turn out to be a relatively low-skilled group. As others have shown, Cubans fall roughly in the middle of the skill hierarchy for the nation's immigrant population; most of Miami's other key newcomer groups, however, lie in the bottom half of that distribution. Moreover, Asian immigrants, generally the most highly skilled among today's new foreign-born population, have yet to make an appearance of any note, making Miami the only immigrant region on which high-skilled immi grants have yet to converge. The association of skill and geographic ori gins at once reduces the ethnic diversity of Miami's foreign-born resi dents, while also pushing immigrant Miamians down in the earnings profile, at least as compared to the national average. And as Ellis's chapter showed, the 19805 made matters worse in this respect, as the wage inequality in ;\1iami increased substantially, to the detriment of its foreign-born population.
As an immigrant center, then, Miami lacks allure. Within that con text, it is still possible to conclude that the Cuban story is one of suc cess, though success as tempered by the limits of the place in question. However, the chapters in this book speak in favor of a less rosy assess ment. We note that the relevant information is not always gathered at the appropriate level of disaggregation. Clark, in chapter 5, shows that poverty levels among Miami's Hispanic immigrants, including long settled immigrants, rank far above native-born white norms, but this finding does not capture the Cuban pattern alone. question open. But other chapters bring us closer to resolution. As Clark points out, poverty afflicts Cuban heads of households to a distressingly de gree; poverty is particularly common among Cuban households headed by women, whose numbers are far from trivial. As I find in 3, on the working poor, Cuban men, but not Cuban women, display high levels of labor force attachment. Working Cuban men do reasonably well in securing jobs that meet the standard of employment adequacy, but only if one controls for education-which keeps overall Cuban els well below those for native-born whites. To be sure, Cubans' situa tion looks better than that of Mexicans, but not so good as to be aIded an unvarnished "success."
Nloreover, whatever success one finds does not seem attributable to the growth of an ethnic economy or enclave, however one might term it. As Der-Martirosian and I showed in chapter 7, ethnic niches account for a small portion of the Cuban employment base-a pattern particu larly evident when compared to the configurations observed for almost every other group. Such as they are, the concentrations seem unlikely to provide the lever for accelerated upward mobility or diminished wage pressure. On the one hand, reliance on niches has been declining, with settlers dispersing to other activities and new arrivals less often con verging on niches. And, on the other hand, Cuban clusters show up mainly in industries and occupations that poorly on a range of in dicators measuring job quality. Admittedly, those indicators do not in clude income-though other studies have shown them to generally cor quite closely with earnings. Whether we are right or wrong about the particular niche Cubans oc cupy in Miami, its importance would necessarily diminish as Cubans' of the region's population and labor grew. Perhaps Cubans once converged on a cluster of jobs that significant advantages, at least relative to the alternatives at hand. But now that Cubans have such a dominant presence, the most important are those associ ated with the group's concentration in Miami and the economic charac teristics of that region as a whole-as opposed to impacts that might de rive any cluster established within this particular regional economy. Although the ethnic economy offers many chances to get started, it pro vides limited opportunities to move up the socioeconomic ladder.
Unfortunately, we cannot provide a full account of the pattern of Cuban incorporation-a failing only excusable in that this was never our goal. But we can assay an alternative interpretation: In Miami, ironically, the incorporation of Cuban immigrants proceeded more or less as the conventional sociological accounts would have predicted, via assimilation. If we understand dispersion to denote assimilation, then our data on niches support the idea that Cubans are assimilating into mainstream Miami; that relatively few Cubans work in clusters implies dispersion to the occupations and industries where other Mi amians work. Moreover, assimilation of this sort would not be sur prising in light of the distinctive characteristics of both Cuban migra tion and the region on which Cubans converged: Cubans arrived with skills that were sooner or likely to prove valuable, and the U.S. government sought to ease Cubans' entry into the Miami economy. In addition, in the particular Miami configuration, Cubans were unlikely to end up as a persistent bottom-level group. In Los Angeles, Mexi cans have a long history as the preferred workforce for the least desir able jobs; and the magnitude Mexican migration and the stigma Anglo Angelenos have long attached to Mexicans made it relatively easy for post-I965 Mexican immigrants to supplant African Ameri cans at the end of the labor queue. But in Miami, Cubans always en joyed the advantage associated with an ethnic order that put some other group-namely, African Americans-unambiguously at the bot tom.
7 For this reason, the disrepute associated with refugees' initial jobs as busboys, waiters, or garment workers never stuck. Moreover, competition for better jobs was limited. Next in line were African Americans, who did manage to get government jobs, as Lim has noted, but were not difficult to bump out, or leap over, in the pri vate sector. s And the expanded and diversified immigrant influx pushed Cubans up the ladder, as suggested by very high foreign born proportion in each of the black niches in the public sector-far higher in Miami than in any other immigrant a contrast that is particularly noticeable when the comparison is extended to LA. While I leave it to readers and other researchers to fully pursue the leads sketched out here, the findings of this book establish the peculiarities of this sun belt immigrant city. Miami appears to bea place of limited immigrant opportunity, one in which the patterns established by its newcomers are likely to diverge from the trajectories at work in the other capitals of immigrant America.
Conclusion: Urban America and the Immigrant Future
Immigration: The Long View
If we take the long view, immigration's persistence, not its restriction, distinguishes the American experience during the twentieth century. Granted, the forces' of restriction did succeed in closing the open door that had allowed passage from old to new world more or less unhin dered by the state. This old freedom never returned, even as the gate ways to newcomers reopened after midcentury. But a close examina tion of the record underlines the difficulties encountered in closing the United States off to the world. The flow from Europe had no sooner abated than growers and industrialists in the Southwest stimulated mi gration from Mexico and their counterparts in the East and Midwest substituted African American migrants for the foreigners they could no longer recruit. The depression of the 1930S kept people in place-and encouraged U.S. authorities to expel Mexican immigrants, regardless of citizenship and other niceties. As soon as the economy revived with the advent of World War II, employers of alien labor remembered its charms-hence the Bracero program, to which modern Mexican migra tion owes its start. Before the war, America somehow could not muster the will and wherewithal to welcome refugees in search of safe haven; after the war, it faced new, ultimately irresistible, pressures to absorb persons stranded and displaced by Europe's devastation. Thus, refugee policy in the aftermath of World War II revealed greater benevolence, though the selection procedures involved a curious preference for for mer enemies rather than for those the enemies had persecuted .
Most important, the internationalism and anticommunism of the time made it hard to use immigration law as a cordon sanitaire; thus, the 1950S saw the doors reopen, first for Hungarian refugees and then for Cubans, who received an unusually warm welcome. In the mid 1960s, under the influence of the civil rights revolution, Congress sought to undo the wrongs it had perpetuated a decade before. On the one hand, it abolished the national origins quota, opening up the United States to areas of the world from which immigration had been hindered, most notably Asia. On the other hand, it ended the Bracero program, attempting to relieve a mainly Mexican American group of farmworkers from competition with lower-cost Mexican immigrant labor but ultimately driving the Mexican migration stream under ground.
Various factors then amplified the immigrant presence. With the new immigrant influx came the buildup of ethnic networks that facilitated migration from the most recent sending countries; a legal framework that allocated quotas to persons with close kinship ties to U.S. citizens and permanent residents simply lent additional dynamism to the under lying network-driven nature of the migration process. Immigrants also found friends in the labor market, among them immigrant employers, whose ranks expanded and diversified as the foreign-born presence in ,-n. .,.,,,.,,, at the high end of the labor market. The post-civil rights envi ronment also emboldened immigrant advocates, including ethnic lead ers and organizations and human rights, civil rights, and religious groups, all of which had a good deal more fight and influence than the immigrant organizations of the early twentieth century. For reasons of international politics, the United States facilitated several large-scale flows, though the welcome mat was put out with only limited sensitivity to the need to protect the truly persecuted. Occasionally, as in the mid-1990s, anti-immigrant forces erupted; in 1996 laws were passed that significantly diminished the entitlements of legal residents while also deterrence efforts in consular offices and at the borders and deportation efforts in U.S. interior. But the spasm of re striction soon passed, as Washington quickly revoked key aspects of the 1996 legislation. From this attack, immigrants learned that the best de fense lay in the vote, an instrument whose invocation political leaders immediately appreciated, especially in the immigrant-dense states of New York, Florida, Texas, and California. Thus, in 1998 a Congress similar to the one that had sought to curb inflows and penalize unwanted immigrants decided to facilitate the entry of an expanded group of professionals, who would officially arrive in the United States as temporary workers but would in many cases come to stay. The United States thus exited the twentieth century as an immigration coun try of notable dimensions, with considerable pressure to keep the door open.
Of course, perspective is needed. One can of an immigrant tide, but as we pointed out in an earlier chapter, foreign-born pro portion of the u.s. population remains much smaller than it was a hun dred years ago. Close to a million people are admitted to the United States as immigrants each year-far more than Congress envisioned when it passed the Hart-Celler Act in 1965-but millions more are waiting in line all over the world. The United States 300,000 un documented persons each year, but the inflow is relatively when measured the more than 5 million people who enter United States legally each year for business, study, or pleasure-not immigration-and typically head home. Evaluated against the supply of potential immigrants, the immigrant inflow appears to be quite mod est and under very good control.
Nonetheless, controversy over the immigration system continues. While questions how many immigrants we should admit and accord ing to which selection criteria-kinship, skills, or some combination of the two-certainly attention, one should be wary of both the temptation to novel answers and the relevance of this type of de bate. In a sense, our options are largely shaped by the actions we have already taken and the changes in the world around us. The international flows of goods, and people are accelerating, and the United States is moving toward greater economic integration with its neighbors. Since the same changes in communication and technology that lubricate trade also facilitate migration, the ties between immigrant communities and their home societies are likely to consolidate, not wither. :Moreover, America has spent recent decades establishing and consolidating net works that link veterans to new arrivals and potential migrants; in the immigrant-dense regions with which this book is concerned, the same networks deeply embed immigrants in particular sectors of the econ omy, which have now adapted to the inflow of a foreign-born labor force. Connections of these sorts are hard to uproot and are likely to ex ercise a deep inertial effect for years to come. The past also influences the politics of immigration. America's self-definition is that of a "coun try of immigration"; the most powerful interpretive frame thus situates immigration as a defining American trait, and the post-civil rights rein terpretation of the civic nation sanctions against restrictive measures of the type pursued earlier in the century. Immigrant Americans are also hardly powerless. They stand all the more influential when allied to native-born members of proximal host groups with an origin in a com mon place and an identity deriving from a similar experience-that is, the ethnic lobbies and advocacy organizations.
Immigration policy can change, but only incrementally, with shifts toward serious restriction encountering great, possibly insurmountable, opposition. But this policy debate proves of limited relevance at a time when roughly 10 percent of the country's population was born abroad and another 10 percent consists of the children of immigrants. While it is certainly true that many immigrants do return home-roughly 20 percent of I980 to I990 arrivals bulk of those living in the United States at any given time are here to stay.9 The cen tral question, then, does not so much concern the state and characteris tics of tomorrow's newcomers-all the more so since those factors have largely been determined. Rather, the issue at hand concerns the prospects of today's immigrants and immigrant offspring. Will new comers gain full membership in a society they have already joined? Or will they be excluded, whether implicitly or explicitly, from complete participation in the civic nation? Broadly speaking, we can find two answers to questions of this sort, one accenting the positive and mutually reinforcing consequences of immigrants' search for opportunity, and the second emphasizing the obstacles newcomers will meet and the self-defeating responses that will result. The intellectual debate revolves around the competing nar ratives of assimilation or the underc1ass, the plausibility of each sce nario enhanced by one's opposition to the other and the exclusion of al ternative frameworks.
The Underclass Scenario
While there is nothing new in the imagery of immigrants as present or potential underclass, contemporary formulations take a distinctive twist. Capitalist societies have never had much fondness for the idleness of the poor, but until the advent of the social welfare state the poor had few alternatives but to work. It was immigrants as workers, therefore, on whom native-born observers projected their anxiety, viewing the la boring class as dangerous; the stigma attached to the hard and menial jobs the imported outsiders performed only added to the disrepute of the foreign-born. In the current context, work at the bottom continues to stigmatize those groups clustered in the lowest ranks, but those who do not work are the objects of greatest reprobation.
For the most part, immigrants have been shielded from the under class brush. On the one hand, the foreign-born stand out for their high rates of employment, as we have seen. No reputational quality, includ ing industriousness, is entirely good-thus hard-working immigrants can also be feared for being too much so and therefore stealing the jobs that Americans would otherwise want-but the traits associated with idleness, such as laziness, invite much greater scorn and dislike. On the other hand, there is a cultural place for the foreign-born in a self proclaimed "nation of immigrants" that provides a degree of shelter not enjoyed by the one group around whom the underc1ass rhetoric has crystallized: African Americans. To the extent that the underclass de bate concerns the "ghetto underclass," it applies to a particular popula tion infused by Euro-Americans with a negative affect, which the dom inant groups have not (yet) extended to the foreign-born.
Once in place, however, the notion of the underclass provides a frame for constructing an interpretation of the immigrant experience as well. There are good reasons to be concerned about the possibility that a small, but still significant, share of the immigrant population will be unable to rise above poverty levels (as Clark mentions in chapter 5). And though the debate over immigrants' utilization of welfare benefits and other social services is partly motivated by narrow political con cerns, it is at once legitimate and to be expected: regardless of the lia bilities associated with foreign birth, the very low skills of certain im migrants increase the likelihood of welfare receipt-as shown by much research. Still, poverty status does not inherently denote an underclass; representing poor immigrants as an underclass involves a considerable conceptual leap that has not yet been justified. And it is hard to imagine that invocation of the underclass concept itself does not add to what ever stigma, and therefore liabilities, the poorest of immigrants have to shoulder.
Assimilation in Question
Are we back to assimilation? If understood as progress pure and simple, the answer might be yes. Clearly, that version of the assimilation story receives ample support from the chapters in this book. While immi grants begin with considerable disadvantages, matters improve over time, even among those who start out with skill deficits of the most pro found sort. Wages rise, as do employment probabilities and the likeli hood of holding an adequately paying job. And poverty rates are high est among the most recent arrivals, who have not yet had time to start an ascent. Moreover, the factors pushing immigrants into poverty are inversely related to those increasing labor force attachment: as immi grants secure positions of adequate quality, the degree of impoverish ment diminishes. :-.rotwithstanding our emphasis on immigrants' wide spread tendency to cluster in niches and remain there, only a minority of immigrants persist in niches as settlement deepens. And the most optimistic indicators are those gleaned from our examination of the second generation, which appears to be escaping the dire fate forecast for it.
But as noted in chapter I, how one answers the assimilation question depends largely on how it is posed. If the standard is absolute progress, then this book has furnished positive evidence aplenty, but if the stan dard takes the form of relative progress, a different perspective is likely in order.
If we pose the question in relative terms, then the root deficiencies of the assimilation perspective loom a good deal larger. As the dictionary defines it, assimilation involves a process of growing similarity, in which immigrants and their descendants shed the differences that dis tinguish them from core members-whoever they might be-of the host society. But this definition suffers from a signal deficiency: the evant differences do not simply include those immigrants bring with them but also those created by the very circumstances under which they come and the conditions under which they interact with the native born. Consequently, as the literature emphasizes, context matters: indi vidual fates are affected by self-understandings, as well as the under standings of others, of the social categories to which they are assigned. The views and expectations entertained by others of one's own kind and those who perceive and assign difference delimit one's options. Thus, the specificities of time and place circumscribe trajectories, with out necessarily locking individuals in place.
For our purposes, context matters most for those who enter at the bottom, and still more in those regions where the immigrant concentra tion now defines what it means to occupy the lowest ranks. In this re spect, it is important to remember precisely what the assimilation per spective forgets: from the standpoint of users of immigrant labor, the foreign-born are useful precisely because they are different; their dual fI:;11n~_2.0!~!Ke and_th~_U:_s!.a.tus as less entitled Il1akes them ideal candidates to fill the jobs others d6-notwa.ilT:~f6riithe perspective of employers, immigrants' suitability for the society's dirty work serves as one of immigrants' salient traits and, of course, their greatest virtue. Moreover, an economic habit of this sort is hard to curb. Absent immi grant cooks and hotel housekeepers, room and restaurant prices go up-not a desirable outcome in industries in which price competition is rife. One might want a larger number of better educated English speaking workers, but improving the "quality" of workers assigned to low-status, unpalatable jobs would require a hike in wages and benefits that this new age of inequality seems not to allow. Thus, once started, dependence on immigrant labor becomes difficult to overcome.
Its persistence is of course fueled by networks, which are important both because efficiency and because of the resources that immi grants gain from their ethnic social connections as those ties build up . The process of migration creates the seeds out of which ethnic social structures develop. Most important, the contacts veterans and newcomers for an immigrant economic that expands steadily, and with a dynamic of its own.
Thus, congregate at the bottom of the socioeconomic hi erarchy. The functions immigrants fill then come to define them, adding further to whatever stigma is already associated with foreign origins. Immigrants' otherness is thus not solely a personal attribute but also a characteristic of the society they enter, which enhances rather than diminishes differences between the native-and foreign-born. In the conventional approach, such differences denote a lag, or even fail ure, in the rate of assimilation-but that perspective mistakes cause for effect. most crucial differences, instead, are those created both through the process of migration and by members of the host group.
With thoughts in mind, I return to the matter of second-gener ation Zhou's chapter 8 points squarely in a different direction than that signaled by the specter of a second-generation underclass. In many respects, the story is a good deal more positive than the emerging literature would allow: when contrasted with comparable members of the generation (though not to their parents, a comparison the data do not allow), the story appears to be one of second-generation progress, not Mexicans, at once the largest second-generation group and the most numerous to have made their way into adulthood, provide the best case in point. Rather than slipping out of the world of work-to which the first generation is so strongly attached-the second genera-' tion actually remains more attached. Further dis aggregations by gender would reinforce the point. As noted in chapter 3, employment rates for Mexican immigrants reveal a striking gap. For second-genera tion Mexican women, however, other evidence points to considerable convergence toward the Euro-American, native-born norm, as the U.S. born daughters of Mexican parents show much higher rates of eco nomic activity than the preceding generation.
And it is not simply a matter of just having a job-however much that counts. At some base level, later generations of Mexican Angelenos show clear signs of occupational improvement, relative to their immi grant counterparts, as Zhou shows. ~1oreover, the change is doing much ro narrow the employment gap separating them from native whites. By the second generation, the uniformly proletarian nature of the immigrant population gives way to an occupational profile in white-collar employment more clearly in line with the economy of the times. To be sure, most of the gain involves a shift into the less-skilled, less-well-remunerated nonmanual sales, administrative, and clerical jobs. Even so, Zhou shows a large increase in the level of professional employment. Thus, if the issue at stake is whether the children of Mexican-born immigrants are stuck at the very bottom, the best answer appears to be no.
But that may be the wrong question to pose, since second-generation progress is entirely consistent with persistent disadvantage relative ro dominant groups. As Zhou notes, many second-generation groups are likely to catch up to, if not surpass, Euro-Americans: the of Asian Americans seems particularly bright. But prospects for the chil dren of Mexican, Central American, and Caribbean immigrants of var ious origins do not glitter. For these groups, the most likely second generation scenario would be movement into the ranks of the working and lower middle class, as in the past. That status may be impressive from the standpoint of the sending communities back home, but it is likely to seem much less grand if the group still falls short of the re wards enjoyed by the average American.
In addition, the regional factors we have highlighted throughout this book will probably weigh heavily in the process. Although second generation immigrants are likely to drift away from the key immigrant regions, many will stay where they have grown up; to extent that immigrants continue to occupy the bottommost rung, that presence will yield a persistent shadow, affecting the prism through which the chil dren of immigrants will be seen. In the key immigrant more over, class and ethnicity are aligned in distinctive ways. As Ellis empha sizes in chapter 4, inequality is particularly noticeable in these capitals of immigrant America. More to the point, the remaining Euro-American residents are increasingly absent from the lower and even middle ranks. Class and ethnicity therefore tend to overlap in ways that cu mulate advantages for Euro-Americans (and possibly Asian Ameri cans) but reinforce disadvantages for second-generation groups of other origins. And if Euro-Americans set the standard ro which others aspire, their distinctively high position in the regional class structure is likely to at once stand out and provoke resentment in those with much lesser prospects.
The future for America's immigrant regions, then, may take a very different road than that mapped by the governing narratives. Some im migrants and their offspring will undoubtedly slumber in a lower class, from which there is little, if any, opportunity to exit; others will rapidly move up the totem pole, putting the assimilation of yesterday's immi grants to shame. But the main drift is likely to be different, taking the form of a conflict among the new and old ethclasses that emerge from the intersection of class and ethnicity. That the new ethclasses will have advanced from the bottom is precisely why they will be ready to mount a challenge, as they have both the resources needed for mobilization and the awareness of just how much they lack. And the emerging eth class conflict will be facilitated by the presence of an ethnic elite, stem ming from immigrant or, more likely, second-generation ranks and fully equipped with the symbolic tools needed to mobilize their coeth nics and make gains on their behalf. After the experience of the last cen tury, one would be foolish to look to some new social group as the force destined to move history forward. But rather than projecting our anxieties or wishes on to immigrants, as either underclass or assimila tion scenarios do, we would do better to acknowledge the potential for deep social conflict resulting from the immigrant quest for progress and the obstacles that such a search entails. Poor immigrant parents may have been relatively powerless, but not their children. We can count on them for concerted efforts to gain dignity and also to assert, through ef forts both practical and large, a different vision of their place in the world. Such are the prospects for urban America and the newcomers who will transform it. Let us await exciting times.
Notes
